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The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights
Richard G. Wilkins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two months ago, when I was asked to make a presentation
on the history, structure and derivation of the Bill of Rights, I
was quite hesitant-and for a very good reason. True, I teach
constitutional law. But since when did constitutional
law-which focuses on the occasionally literate meanderings of
the Supreme Court-have anything to do with the history,
structure or derivation of the Bill of Rights? I therefore invoked
ignorance and begged to be passed over. However, Ted Lewis/
who called me repeatedly on the issue, was not to be dissuaded.
Mter several discussions, I caved in and agreed to participate.
And, when pressed for a topic, I responded with a title that I
thought was grandiloquent enough to be academically
impressive while still being vague enough to permit almost
limitless fudging. "I will speak on the structural role of the Bill
of Rights," I said.
The structural role of the Bill of Rights? Ted was kind
enough not to snigger, and he dutifully transcribed the title
and passed it on to those who prepared today's agenda.
Doubtless many of you in the audience are here-not merely to
obtain needed Continuing Legal Education credit in a relatively
painless fashion-but also to see just how Wilkins could press
the Bill of Rights into a structural mold.
Generally, when one talks of "structure" in the
constitutional law context, the discussion centers around the
governmental plan erected by the first three Articles of the
Constitution: a tripartite federal government with separated
and specifically limited powers operating in tandem (and often
in tension) with the states. By contrast, the Bill of Rights is not
generally thought of as a "structural" component, but rather as
*
1.
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a guarantor of especially important freedoms. Thus, in
conventional terminology, the Bill of Rights is not "structural"
but rather is designed to keep government (however structured)
off the backs of the people.
But, despite the general accuracy of the foregoing, I believe
that the Bill of Rights has played-and continues to
play-several important structural roles. Perhaps not roles
perfectly consistent with the classic definition of "structure"
just noted, but structural nevertheless.
As an initial matter, the Bill of Rights played a vital
structural role in securing the passage of the Constitution. 2 It
is quite possible that we simply would not have had the
Constitution of 1787 without a wrenching political agreement
to amend that document to include the Bill of Rights. That
political debate focused on structure, and resulted in the
insertion of an explicitly structural component into the Bill of
Rights-the Tenth Amendment.
Second, the Bill of Rights has played a significant-and
somewhat ironic-role in restructuring American federalism
over the past century. 3 The Bill of Rights, originally intended
to protect the individual against federal power and secure the
reserved sovereignty of the states, has instead become a potent
means of subjecting the states to federal control. In a very real
sense, the Antifederalist "victory" embodied in the Bill of
Rights has become the Antifederalists' ultimate defeat.
Third, and finally, the Bill of Rights is now playing a
decisive role in restructuring modern society by redefining the
contemporary limits of community power. 4 The specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights-originally designed to regulate
the interaction of the government with the individual-have
been expanded to create a generalized, constitutional doctrine
of "privacy" or "autonomy" that directs (and sometimes
controls) the purely personal interaction of private individuals.
All three of these structural roles-which for the sake of
discussion I will label the "historical," the "ironical," and the
"sociological"-merit some attention during our celebration of
the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights. The
historical role of the Bill of Rights is instructive, not only for its
own sake, but for whatever light it might shed on the future

2.
3.
4.

See infra part II.
See infra part Ill.
See infra part IV.
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interpretation of the document. The ironical use of the Bill of
Rights to submerge state sovereignty raises continuing
questions about the proper role of federalism in American life.
The impact of modern "rights" rhetoric on the sociology of the
American community, furthermore, raises issues that must be
addressed-not only by thoughtful lawyers and judges-but by
the best minds of every profession.
With this background, and with the caveat that my
ruminations on these topics are quite preliminary, I will
attempt a few personal observations on the various structural
roles of the Bill of Rights. First, I will address the role of the
Bill of Rights in structuring the Constitution of 1787. My
comments on this historical role are somewhat more detailed
than those on the ironical or sociological roles-in part because
Ted asked me to structure my remarks that way and in part
because the history of the Bill of Rights is a topic on which
most lawyers have little or no passing knowledge.
II.

STRUCTURING THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: THE ROLE OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS

The notion that certain rights were "fundamental" or
"inalienable" was well-established in America by 1787. 5 The
Magna Carta of 1215 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689
had established various "rights of Englishmen," including the
right to a trial by a jury of one's peers, a prohibition on
standing armies in time of peace, and a limited form of freedom
of speech. 6 As Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry noted in
their recent history of the American Constitution, "In theory, if
not in practice, British and colonial governments-as well as
the infant state governments-lacked power to deprive citizens
of certain rights. Such rights belonged inherently to all citizens,
even in the absence of written protections."7
This theory of rights was rooted firmly in natural law. The
Declaration of Independence and state declarations of rights,
drafted immediately following the Revolution, were grounded
upon natural law notions of "inalienable" and "self-evident"
rights. 8 The 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, for

fi.

DANIEL A. FARRER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF

CONS1'!1'UTION 219 (1990).

6.
7.
R.

!d.
!d.
!d.

nm
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example, provided: "That all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and
inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."9
The influential Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by
George Mason, echoed these natural law themes, and in
addition, evidenced a pronounced distrust and fear of
governmental power. Mason wrote that "all power is vested in,
and consequently derived from, the People," who retain an
"unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or
abolish" governments they establish. 10
To preserve the independence of the states as well as the
natural rights of mankind, the drafters of the Articles of
Confederation purposely created a weak national government
that lacked such essential powers as the ability to regulate
commerce and levy taxes. 11 Such a governmental structure
promoted individual liberty by denying government the power
to intrude upon either the state or the individual. But that
liberty came at a high cost. In denying the federal government
the power to intrude, the Articles of Confederation seemingly
denied the federal government the power to exist. 12
By 1787, the new nation was a veritable shamble. Lacking
the power to tax, the continental congress was unable to pay
the outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War or maintain
an effective army. 13 Unable to regulate commerce, the federal
government stood helpless as the states engaged in internecine
commercial warfare. 14 As a result, Noah Webster described
the new nation as a "pretended union" limping its way toward
disaster. 15
To prevent that disaster, the Constitutional Convention
convened in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. The high
purpose of that convention-ostensibly called to amend the
Articles of Confederation-was, instead, to create an entirely
new form of government. 16 Opposition to this enterprise,
8.
!d. at 220 (quoting THE 1776 PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §
(1976)).
Irl. at 221.
10.
11.
Srr id. at 24-25.
12.
THE STATES RI<lHTS DEBATE 15 (Alpheus T. Mason cd., 2d ed. 1972).
l:i.
FAHRER & SHERRY, supra note fi, at 24.
14.
!d. at 2fi.
Flaws in the First Charter, LIFE, Sept. 1987, at 22, 22.
1fi.
See ROBERT A. RUTLAND, ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1966) ("The
16.
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which envisioned a relatively strong central government, was
almost immediate. Debate over the new Constitution quickly
polarized into two competing political camps: the Federalists
(who supported adoption of the new Constitution) and the
Antifederalists (who opposed the new governmental
structure). 17
The Antifederalist movement was animated by the two
basic concerns that had spawned the Articles of Confederation:
states' rights and personal liberties. 18 Their overriding
concern, however, was almost certainly the former and not the
latter. 19 Indeed, most historians agree that Antifederalist
worries regarding the absence of a Bill of Rights were
secondary to their concerns regarding states' rights. 20
Nevertheless, early in the ratification struggle Antifederalist
leaders learned that citizens were more easily aroused by
appeals for personal liberty than with talk of federalism and
states' rights. 21 Thus, the Antifederalists quickly focused upon
the lack of a Bill of Rights as a rallying call to mobilize public
opinion in support of their movement.
Using the Bill of Rights issue to oppose the new
Constitution proved attractive on several grounds. For one
thing, Antifederalist leaders had little trouble joining states'
rights concerns with arguments in favor of a Bill of Rights. The
natural law tendencies of the times, coupled with the fact that
virtually every state had adopted declarations protective of
these natural rights, made state and individual rights
arguments often appear as intertwining, indivisible themes. 22
So much so, that during the ratification process it was often
difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the two basic
Antifederalist motives. 23 For example, George Mason's classic
"Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the
Convention" raised the alarm that, by subjecting the states to
federal control, the new constitution gravely endangered
personal liberty. Why? Because in the federal Constitution,

moving spirits behind the Convention had no further use for the Articles of
Confederation, but it would have been imprudent to bare this attitude publicly.").
17.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 175-76.
18.
THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 5.
Jd. at 98.
19.
ld. at 104 n.178.
20.
21.
RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 218.
22.
See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 219-21.
23.
THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 98.

530

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

"There is no Declaration of Rights; and the Laws of the general
Government being paramount to the Laws & Constitutions of
the several States, the Declarations of Rights in the separate
States are no Security."24
But, the most potent advantage the Bill of Rights issue
afforded the Antifederalists was not the palatable buffer it
provided for discourses on states rights. Rather, the absence of
a Bill of Rights was genuinely troubling to a recently liberated
populace that believed in natural, inalienable rights. 25 Brutus,
a New York Antifederalist essayist publishing in New York in
November of 1787, wrote, "in forming a government on its true
principles, the foundation should be laid . . . by expressly
reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as
are not necessary to be parted with. 26 Brutus argued that the
need to expressly reserve "essential natural rights" was
"confirmed by universal experience" which had "induced the
people in all countries, where any sense of freedom remained,
to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers." 27
Noting that every state in the fledgling Union contained bills or
declarations of rights, Brutus concluded that "It is therefore the
more astonishing, that this grand security, to the rights of the
people, is not to be found in this [federal] constitution."28
Federalist supporters responded to these criticisms in a
number of ways. States' rights arguments were deflected by
emphasizing that the federal govemment possessed only
specific, enumerated powers. Madison wrote, in The Federalist
No. 45, that "[tlhe powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State govemments are
numerous and indefinite."29 As a result, Madison asserted
that "[tlhe State governments will have the advantage of the
federal government.":30

24.
Letter of Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed hy the
Convention from George Mason, Virginia Assemplyman, Constitutional Convention,
to George Washington, President of the United States (17R7), rPprinted in THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 34R (JOliN P.
KAMINSKI ET AL. eds., 19R1) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
25.
FAHmJR & SHERRY, »upra note fi, at 222-23.
Id. at 22:1.
26.
27.
!d. at 22:1-24.
2R.
Id. at 224.
29.
THE F@EHAL!ST No. 4fi, at :12H (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
30.
Id. at :126.
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On the issue of individual liberty, the Federalists
consistently maintained that the "Constitution's institutional
checks provided more effective security" for individual rights
than a Bill of Rights. 31 They submitted that a federal
government with enumerated powers, operating in competition
with state governments, eliminated the need for a bill of
rights. 32 Thus, in Federalist No. 84, Hamilton asserted that,
because "bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between
kings and their subjects," Americans "have no need of
particular reservations" of rights since "in strictness the people
surrender nothing" and "retain every thing." 33 And, m
Federalist No. 28, Hamilton invoked federal/state rivalry to
argue that:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the
same disposition towards the general government. The people,
by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make
it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can
make use of the other as the instrument of redress. 34

Federalists, finally, asserted that any enumeration of
protected rights would be positively dangerous for at least two
reasons. First, the enumeration might unwittingly expand the
power of the federal government. In Hamilton's words, a bill of
rights containing "various exceptions to powers not granted"
might "afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were
granted."35 A provision protecting the press, for example,
could "afford[] a clear implication that a power to prescribe the
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in
the national government."36
The second danger lurking behind a bill of rights in
Federalist eyes was the possibility that an enumeration would
improperly cabin the natural rights of man. James Iredell
cautioned that:

THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 85.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 224; THE STATES RIGHTS DEI:IATE,
supra note 12, at 187.
33.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 29, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton).
34.
Id. No. 28, at 225.
:cl5.
Id. No. 84, at 5:clfi.
36.
Id.
31.
32.
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[l]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a
number of rights which are not intended to be given up;
because it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that
every right not included in the exception might be impaired
by the government without usurpation; and it would be
impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not
contained in it."37

With the lines thus drawn between the Federalists and the
Antifederalists, the debate regarding a Bill of Rights raged
throughout the ratification period. The debate, indeed, began
even before the Constitutional Convention had completed its
work. On August 20, 1787, Charles Pinckney submitted a
proposal safeguarding "liberty of the Press," prohibiting the use
of religious tests, and limiting the maintenance of troops in
times of peace. 38 Pinckney's proposal was rejected. 39 Two
more attempts to add a Bill of Rights by George Mason and
Elbridge Gerry were similarly rejected. 40 On September 16,
1787-the day before the Constitutional Convention finished its
labors-Edmund Randolph, objecting to what he called '"the
indefinite and dangerous power given by the Constitution to
Congress,' proposed to amend the ratification procedure" by
granting state ratifying conventions the power to propose
amendments "'which should be submitted to and finally decided
on by another General Convention."'41 This motion, like the
others, failed. 42 As a result, Randolph, Elbridge Gerry, and
George Mason refused to sign the Constitution when it was
adopted by the Convention the very next day. 43
Having lost the Bill of Rights battle in the constitutional
convention, the Antifederalists carried the fight to the
Continental Congress. In Congress, Richard Henry Lee led the
Antifederalist charge. He argued that Congress should amend

::17.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 224 (quoting North Carolina Ratifying
Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 167 (Jonathan
Elliot ed. 1981)).
88.
ld.
39.
!d.
40.
!d.
41.
ld.
42.

43.

!d.
!d.
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the Constitution before sending it to the respective states for
ratification. 44 Lee was of the opinion that amendments should
contain a Bill of Rights to "'plainly and strongly' provide
bulwarks for the states against the national government,
particularly the south[ern] states .... "45 Congress, however,
heeded the careful arguments of James Madison that Congress
could not amend the new Constitution without making it an
Act of Congress (that would have to be ratified by all thirteen
state legislatures), rather than an Act of the Convention (which
could be ratified by the action of nine state ratifying
conventions). 46 Evidently fearful that the new Constitution
would not be ratified if it went before the various legislatures,
the Continental Congress rejected the amendment proposal and
sent the Constitution on to the state ratifying conventionsY
Now thwarted in the convention and Congress, the
Antifederalists renewed their efforts before the state
conventions. All involved knew that the greatest battles over
the Constitution were yet to be fought. Moreover, it was
apparent that the battle for "the Constitution would be won or
lost in a few large states."48 And, it was in those few states
that the debate over the Bill of Rights played a pivotal role.
Pennsylvania was the first major state to ratify. That state
ratified the Constitution only twenty hours after the
Continental Congress had transferred the document to the
states for their consideration. 49 Pennsylvania, however, was
not much of a test for the Constitution, nor the Federalist
party. Realizing that momentum was on their side,
Pennsylvania Federalists raced the Constitution through the
convention before the opposition had a chance to get
organized-even going so far as to place several Antifederalist
members under house arrest so that a quorum of members
could be obtained for ratification. 50
In Massachusetts, Virginia and New York, ratification was
not as easily attained. Antifederalists in those states were well

44.
Congressional Debates of the Confederation Congress and the Constitution
(Sept. 26-28 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 24, at 238.
45.
RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 219.
46.
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Sept. 30 1787), in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, t<upra note 24, at 276.
47.
See id.
48.
RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 50.
49.
!d. at 20-21.
!d. at 20.
50.
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organized and had gained substantial popular support. To head
off almost certain defeat in these large key states, the
Federalists retreated on the amendment issue. Realizing that
conditional amendments imposed by state conventions would be
fatal to the cause, Federalists in Massachusetts proposed that
the state convention ratify the Constitution, but attach
recommended amendments to be considered by Congress
following ratification. 51
This proposal was backed by the promises of several
prominent Federalists (including James Madison in Virginia) to
seek the recommended amendments immediately following
ratification. 52 The Massachusetts' compromise caught on, and
was followed in eight states, including Virginia and New
York. 53 These states unconditionally ratified the Constitution,
but attached long and diverse "wish lists" demanding
amendments to the document. 54 Although the details of the
various "wish lists" differed, they were unanimous on one
point: "[a]ll eight ... included among their recommendations
some version of what later become the Tenth Amendment."55
With eventual ratification by eleven of the thirteen states,
including the large key states, the Constitution was adopted.
Nevertheless, the framer's work was not finished. The
Massachusetts' compromise had procured the passage of the
Constitution, but ratification was accompanied by clamorous
demands for important amendments. 56 While these demands
technically could go unheeded as ratification had not been
conditional upon congressional acquiescence in the proposed
amendments, the states still had a formidable weapon at their
disposal. "On May 5, 1789, Virginia submitted to Congress an
application for the calling of a second constitutional convention.
New York followed suit the next day." 57
The proposal for a second constitutional convention caused
great alarm among Federalist forces. Federalist leaders
recognized that a second convention probably would not achieve
the same results as the first. Unlike the first, a second

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
(1985)
56.
57.

THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 92.
Id.
!d. at 92-93.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 225.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 569
(Powell, J., dissenting).
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 226.
!d. at 226.
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convention would not enjoy a cloak of secrecy. 58 The jealousies
of politicians and states would be interjected into the
convention discussions as newspapers published accounts of the
proceedings. 59 Moreover, a second convention was likely to
bring about "precipitous changes" in the structure of the new
government proposed by the Constitution. 60 As James
Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson following New York's
ratification of the Constitution: "'The great danger in the
present crisis is that if another Convention should be soon
assembled, it would terminate in discord . . . or in alterations
of the federal system which would throw back essential powers
into the State Legislatures."'61
"Realizing that adoption of a bill of rights might be the
only way to [avoid a second constitutional convention], James
Madison fulfill[ed] his ... promise to shepherd a Bill of Rights
through the new Congress."62 In large part, Madison's
willingness to sponsor amendments to the Constitution may
have stemmed from his fear that a Bill of Rights could alter the
existing structural provisions of the new Constitution. He was
concerned that-if the Antifederalists took the lead-they
would promote amendments that would damage national
authority. 63
On May 4, 1789, Madison announced to Congress that "he
intended to bring amendments to the Constitution before the
House in late May" and on June 8, 1789, he presented his
amendments to the House of Representatives. 64 Madison's
proposed amendments-initially drafted as amendments to the
existing seven articles of the Constitution-embodied many of
the individual liberties guaranteed in state bills of rights, as
well as general principles garnered from the "wish lists" of the
various state ratification conventions. 65
The proposed amendments included many provisions that
eventually found their way into the Bill of Rights, such as
clauses providing for freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the

fiR.
RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 19.
THE STATE RmHTs DEBATE, supra note 12, at 95.
fi9.
60.
ld. at 96.
61.
RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 266.
62.
FAHBEH & SHEHHY, supra note 5, at 226.
63.
THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 96.
64.
FARBER & SHERHY, supra note 5, at 226.
65.
RICIIAHD B. BEHNSTEIN, AHE WE TO BE A NATION?, 264 (19R7); ROREHT A.
RUTLAND, THE BIHTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 194 (1955).
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right to keep and bear arms, and the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 66 In addition, the
proposed amendments prohibited deprivation of life, liberty and
property without due process of law, the taking of property
without just compensation and cruel and unusual
punishment. 67 Beyond these now-well-known provisions,
Madison proposed amendments regulating the size of the
House of Representatives and exempting a person "religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms" from compelled military service. 68
Two of Madison's proposals directly addressed structural
concerns. His eighth proposed amendment would have added a
new article to the Constitution, just before the present Article
VII, containing two sections. 69 The first section would provide
for strict separation of federal powers, by mandating that "[ t]he
powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that
the Legislative Department shall never exercise powers vested
in the Executive or Judicial," and so on for each branch. 70 The
second section-which in slightly altered form eventually
became the Tenth Amendment-provided that "The powers not
delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively." 71
Madison's second structural proposal addressed both
individual rights and governmental structure. 72 In his fourth
proposed amendment, Madison provided against federal
infringement of religious liberty, free expression and jury trial
in criminal cases. 73 In his fifth proposed amendment, however,
Madison extended these prohibitions to the states with the
following language: "No State shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases." 74 This proposal, of course, was structural in
the same sense that the prohibitions on state power in article I,
section 10 are structural: it constituted a direct federal
constriction of the states' otherwise plenary power. 75
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

FARBJ<;R & SHERRY, supra note f), at 228-29.

!d. at 228.

!d.
!d. at 229.
!d.
!d.
See id. at 229-.'30.
!d. at 228.
ld. at 228 (emphasis added).
Compare id. at 228 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (noting the similarities
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Madison's proposals were debated thoroughly on the floor
of the House, although the Representatives did not-in
complete honesty-attach much importance to the matter.
Members repeatedly complained that there was "much other
and more important business requiring attention." 76 On
August 13, 1789, as Madison struggled to focus the House's
attention on the amendments, John Vining of Delaware noted
that he had the right to call for consideration of a bill
"'establishing a Land Office for the disposal of the vacant lands
in the Westem Territory."' 77 Vining nevertheless yielded the
floor to Madison for discussion of the amendments, but not
without noting that the Vining bill had priority "'in point of
time"' and that "'in point of importance, every candid mind
would acknowledge its preference."' 78
Following House debate, it was decided that the
amendments would be appended to the end of the Constitution
rather than interlineated into the existing articles of the
document. 79 Finally, on August 24, 1789, a House resolution
containing seventeen articles of amendment was sent to the
Senate for consideration. 80
Little is known regarding Senate deliberations, due to the
fact that the Senate sat in closed session until 1794. 81 The
Senate, however, rejected Madison's proposal that conscientious
objectors be excused from military service. The Senate also
rejected several of Madison's structural proposals, including the
article prohibiting the states from violating rights of
conscience, freedom of the press and trial by jury and the
section calling for strict separation of powers in the national
government. 82
As reformulated by the Senate, twelve amendments were
sent to the states for ratification. 83 The first amendment dealt
with congressional apportionment. 84 The second provided that
"No law varying the compensation for the services of the

between the structural prohibitions on state
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at
76.
!d.
77.
78.
!d.
79.
!d. at 240.
80.
BERNS'TEIN, supra note 65, at 267.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at
81.
!d. at 242.
82.
83.
BERNS'TEIN, supra note 65, at 267.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note fi, at
84.

power).
232.

241.

243.
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Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened."85 These
first two amendments were never ratified. 86 The last ten
amendments-now known as the Bill of Rights-became
effective when Virginia became the eleventh state to ratify on
December 15, 1791. 87
The foregoing history establishes, I think, that the Bill of
Rights-viewed in historical perspective-has played a vital
structural role in at least two ways. First, it was structural
arguments by both the proponents and opponents of the
Constitution that brought forth the Bill of Rights.
Second, and more importantly, however, the Bill of Rights
itself reflects important structural compromises struck by the
Federalists and Antifederalists. Madison's proposal to restrict
the power of the states by limiting state regulation of
conscience, free speech and jury trial was rejected. 88 The
amendments that were adopted, moreover, expressly fettered
the federal government while preserving the separate role of
the states. 89 George Mason and other Antifederalists had
repeatedly expressed fears that the new federal government
was so powerful that it would eventually subsumed the
states. 90 The Tenth Amendment, which preserves to the states
all rights "not delegated to the United States," was plainly
designed to eliminate these fears. 91
History, therefore, demonstrates the important structural
role of the Bill of Rights played in securing the adoption of the
Constitution. Perhaps more important for present purposes,
however, is the role the Bill of Rights has played during the
past one-hundred years-and continues to play today-in
structuring American concepts of federalism and community.
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THE IRONICAL ROLE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
RESTRUCTURING AMERICAN FEDERALISM

I would now like to turn attention to the second structural
role played by the Bill of Rights: that is, the ironic role it has
played in restructuring American federalism. That irony results
from the fact that the Bill of Rights-"a notable Antifederalist
victory in 1790-is now appraised as a defeat for state
rights." 92 The advocates of states' rights believed that a Bill of
Rights was necessary to protect the sovereign states from
undue intrusion by the federal government. 93 The very
protections the Antifederalists lobbied for, however, have been
an engine for further subjugation of state power.
This structural shift in power between the federal and
state government has resulted from two factors. The first is the
incorporation doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, by
which the Supreme Court has applied the most important
elements of the first eight amendments to the states. The
second has been the past inability and current unwillingness of
the Supreme Court to construct coherent doctrine under the
Tenth Amendment. The net effect of these two factors has been
a dramatic redrawing of the federal structure of the nation.
History and the writings of the Framers established
beyond reasonable dispute that they did not anticipate that the
Bill of Rights would apply to the states. Indeed, Madison's
proposal to restrict state authority in the areas of conscience,
free speech and jury trials was plainly rejected. 94 In Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore,95 the original Justice Marshall reflected
this original understanding of the Bill of Rights when he wrote:
"Had the framers of the Amendments intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the state governments," he wrote,
"they would have . . . expressed that intention . . . in plain
and intelligible language."96
From 1833, when Barron was decided, to the turn of the
century the Court so frequently reaffirmed Justice Marshall's
opinion that the doctrine became "elementary."97 Nonetheless,
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as one legal scholar in 1926 put it, "[i]nspite of th[e] emphatic
language [reaffirming the doctrine], counsel for defendants,
whether by reason of ignorance, incorrigible optimism, or desire
for delay, continued to urge (chiefly in murder and other
criminal cases), that the Federal Bill of Rights applied to State
legislation."98 Ultimately the persistence of legal counsel bore
fruit.
In 1925, in the case of Gitlow v. New York,"' 9 the Supreme
Court wrote, for the first time, that "freedom of speech and of
the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress- are among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States." 100
This analysis was somewhat surprising, due to the fact
that-only three years earlier-in Prudential Insurance v.
Cheek, 101 the Court had asserted that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the
United States imposes upon the states any restrictions about
'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'; nor, we may add,
does it confer any right of pnvacy upon either persons or
corporations." 10:l
Following Gitlow, the Court developed a relatively
consistent analytical scheme for incorporating various
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court initially queried whether a particular
constitutional protection was "so rooted in the tradition and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 103
By 1968, the analysis had become broader and more inclusive,
with the Court asking whether a particular provision was
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 104
As a result of these formulations, by 1971 the only
provisions of the first eight amendments that had not been
incorporated were the second and third amendments, the fifth
amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment and the
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seventh amendment's guarantee of jury trial in civil cases. 105
Moreover, in a series of cases in the late 1960s, the Supreme
Court established the principle that incorporated provisions of
the Bill of Rights apply to the "states in precisely the same
manner as they appl[y] to the federal government." 106 Thus, if
the exclusionary rule applies to the federal government, it
applies to the states. 107
At the same time that the Supreme Court was invoking
the doctrine of selective incorporation, it was diminishing the
role of the Tenth Amendment. Early cases had invoked the
Amendment to invalidate congressional regulation of the
"purely internal affairs" of the states. 108 Thus, in Hammer v.
Dagenhare 09 the Court struck down a child labor law because
it intruded upon the "local power always existing and carefully
reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution. "110
However, the formulations the Court used in these early
Tenth Amendment cases were not, in all candor, terribly
satisfying. They tended to turn upon rigid, hypertechnical
definitions often far removed from reality. The decisions,
moreover, often stood in the way of what was widely perceived
as social or economic progress-as witnessed by the Court's
invalidation of the child labor law in Dagenhart. 111 As a
result, judicial enforcement of the Amendment underwent a
rapid decline at the end of the 1930s.
Although it was invoked in 1936 to justify the invalidation
of federal legislation fixing maximum hours and minimum
wages in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 112 the Tenth Amendment,
five years later had been reduced, as noted by Justice Stone in
United States v. Darby, 113 to nothing but a "truism." 114
Justice Stone noted that the amendment accurately described
that the states retained all non-delegated powers-but that
description exhausted the amendment's operative force; it
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would not be (and, he inferred, could not be) judicially
enforced. 115
The Tenth remained a mere "truism" for nearly forty years
following Darby. 116 In 1976, however, that Amendment
was revitalized in National League of Cities u. Usery. 117 In
that case Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed
that '"While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism,"' . . . it is not without significance." 118 The majority
in Usery then proceeded to invalidate amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act insofar as they "operate[d] to directly
displace . . . States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions . . . ." 119
The new substantive content of Tenth Amendment
recognized in Usery was short lived. Eight years later, in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority/ 20 the
Court, in a five to four decision, overruled Usery. The Garcia
Court asserted that the traditional governmental function test
enunciated in Usery was as unworkable as the Court's earlier
Tenth Amendment cases. 121 Justice Blackmun then concluded
that the states' active participation in the federal political
process made judicial enforcement of federalism values
unnecessary. According to Justice Blackmun's opinion, the only
check on federal power contemplated by the Constitution was
the one provided by the political process. 122 The Tenth
Amendment was again reduced to nothing but a truism.
One can question whether the incorporation doctrine and
the devaluation of the Tenth Amendment have been unalloyed
blessings. The decisions surveyed above have diminished the
vigor with which state governments can compete within the
federal power structure. Binding the states to every jot and
tittle of the first eight amendments and reducing the Tenth
Amendment to the status of a proverb has limited the ability of
the states, in the words of Justice Powell, to "serve as an
effective 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal
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Government." 123
As the Framers recognized, the federal structure of
government preserves numerous advantages to the people. 124
Although it may not be self-evident why states should retain
substantial independent authority, there are identifiable
advantages to a dual system of government. In "Democracy in
America," Alexis de Tocqueville, asserted,
[t]he strength of free nations resides in the local community.
Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to
science; they bring it within people's reach, they teach people
how to use and enjoy it. Without local institutions, a nation
may establish a free government, but it cannot have the spirit
of liberty. 12 "

Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 126 articulated other
advantages of our federal structure. There, she stated that a
dual system of government:
assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation
in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. 127

Such values do not seem to be widely appreciated by many
in the legal community. The casebook I use in my own
constitutional law course asks the rhetorical question "Why
study federalism?" at the outset of the chapter on the scope of
congressional regulatory authority. 128 The answers that the
authors give are: one, that the study of federalism is
interesting for historical reasons and, two, that the study is
useful for the perspective it can give on the various analytical
tools the Court has developed over time. 129 Not mentioned, of
course, is the possibility that federalism is a value not only
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worthy of historical study and academic admiration, but also of
promotion and preservation.
Justice Louis Brandeis, writing nearly sixty years ago,
argued that:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. 130

The Supreme Court's incorporation doctrine and Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence may discourage useful state
experimentation. Discouraging such experimentation, moreover,
can have significant costs. An advisory commission on
intergovernmental relations recently found that a substantial
number of innovations had first been implemented at the state
or local level, including sunset legislation, zero based
budgeting, equal housing, no fault insurance, pregnancy
benefits for working women, limited access highways, education
for handicapped children, auto pollution standards, and energy
assistance for the poor. 131 Federally mandated standards on
every issue within the reach of the federal constitution can
dampen not only the ardor-but the ability-of state and local
governments to undertake such experiments in the future.
Disregarding federalism concerns may interfere with
federal experimentation as well. It is quite possible, for
example, that the current Supreme Court's unwillingness to
read various protections of the Bill of Rights broadly springs, in
large part, from the fact that an expansive reading of those
protections will bind all courts in the land. When its decisions
have such a dramatic impact, the Court has an understandable
and strong incentive to move cautiously (perhaps too
cautiously) in new areas of the law-and perhaps even cut back
on prior decisions that, for various reasons, may have arguably
gone too far. Thus, although the incorporation doctrine has
undeniably expanded personal liberties throughout the country
on both the state and federal level, one can now wonder
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whether it is not-in fact-operating as something of a brake
on further judicial explication of the Bill of Rights.
There are indications that the Supreme Court will remain
sensitive to federalism concerns. Despite the Court's
application of the first eight amendments to the states
(ostensibly in the exact same form as they apply to the federal
government), the Court has not completely lost sight of
federalism values. The Court, for example, has concluded that
twelve-person juries are not indispensable to the right of trial
by jury 132 and has upheld the constitutionality of less than
unanimous verdicts in some state criminal cases. 133
There are also indications that the Tenth Amendment may
have somewhat more force than Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Garcia would indicate. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 134 decided
earlier this year, Justice O'Connor articulated a "plain
statement rule" to add substantive content to the "political
process check" on congressional power enunciated in
Garcia. 135 In essence, the Court put bite into that political
process check by requiring Congress to make clear its intent to
"'pre-empt the historic powers of the States."' 136
The Antifederalists pushed for a Bill of Rights primarily to
preserve the independent sovereignty of the states. 137 In a
rich historical irony they could not have anticipated, the Bill of
Rights instead became the means by which much of the
residual power retained by the states following the
Constitutional Convention was ceded to the federal
government. As a result, the structure of the nation has been
undeniably altered, raising the question-recently noted by
Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft-"whether our
federalist system has been quite as successful in checking
government abuse as [the Framers] promised." 138
Whatever the answer to that question, Justice Harlan's
observation in Pointer v. Texas 139 is worth remembering:
It is too often forgotten in these times that the American
federal system is itself Constitutionally ordained, that it
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embodies values profoundly making for lasting liberties in this
country, and that its legitimate requirements demand
continuing solid recognition in all phases of the work this
Court. 140
IV.

RESTRUCTURING SOCIETY: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
MODERN AUTONOMY

I would now like to turn to the final structural role I have
identified for the Bill of Rights. That is, its modern role in
structuring not merely governmental power, but society itself.
As the Provost of this University, Bruce Hafen, recently noted,
"it is easy for the contemporary mind to forget that the
concepts embodied in the Bill of Rights were originally
intended to define only the political relationship between
individual citizens and the [Government]-not the domestic
and personal relationships among the citizens themselves." 141
The modern Supreme Court, however, has assured that-at
least for the foreseeable future-the Bill of Rights will be used
not merely to structure governmental relationships, but to
restructure social institutions. 142
If one can believe what one reads in the newspapers and
sees on television, the hottest constitutional topics of the day
are whether the Bill of Rights includes a generalized right of
privacy, and if so, whether the boundaries of that right are
narrow or broad. This "right of privacy"-sometimes recast by
individual Justices as a right of "autonomy"-lies at the heart
of the third structural role of the Bill of Rights. I would
therefore like to briefly discuss two issues: First, where does
this asserted right of privacy come from? Second, what is the
content of the right?
It is relatively easy to pinpoint the Supreme Court decision
that gave rise to the modern right of privacy. Although there
are decisions from the 1920s 143 and the 1940s 144 that have
now been recharacterized as privacy decisions, the font of
modern privacy doctrine is quite clearly Griswold v.
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Connecticut. 145 It is not as easy, however, to pinpoint the
exact constitutional basis for Griswold itself.
The case involved a state law that prohibited the use of
contraceptives by married couples. Justice Douglas' well-known
plurality opinion concluded that the right of privacy was
included within the emanations and shadows of the express
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 146 Douglas adopted this
approach to avoid criticism that the Court was merely engaged
in the type of free-wheeling, substantive due process analysis
exemplified by Lochner v. New York 147 • 148
Other Justices concurring in Griswold, however, feared
that Douglas' approach was-if anything-more uncabined
than Lochner. 149 As a result, they grounded their decision on
the fact that the contraception law interfered with a personal
right so obviously established and so universally accepted that
it was undeniably fundamental. 150 This approach, of course,
comes very near to establishing modern natural law, with the
content of that natural law tied closely to tradition.
The answer to the first question I have posed, therefore, is
this: the modern right of privacy comes from Griswold,
although we can't be quite certain of the precise constitutional
niche for the result announced in that case. 151 The uncertain
categorization of the privacy right recognized in Griswold, in
turn, renders the answer to the second question-what is the
content of the privacy right?-even more difficult. But, it is the
answer to this second question that is of surpassing
importance.
If you doubt the gravity of the second question, you must
have been comatose for the past month. The recent
interrogation of Clarence Thomas by the Senate Judiciary
Committee seemed to suggest that the future of the nation
depended upon his answer to the second question. Judge
Thomas, of course, refused to give an answer, on the ground
that it might influence his impartiality should a case involving
that issue come before him. A more candid answer might have
been that he-like everyone else-is not quite sure what the
145.
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privacy right entails.
The possible content and reach of the modern right of
privacy is exemplified by the differing opinions in Griswold
itself. The rather free-wheeling analysis used by Justice
Douglas has no obvious boundaries. 152 The approach of the
other Justices in Griswold, by contrast, is closely tied to history
and tradition. 153 The first approach would permit Justices to
create rights they would thereafter deem fundamental; the
second approach would restrict the right of privacy to rights
that have been historically and traditionally recognized as
fundamental.
It is simply not clear which of the two approaches
preponderates. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 154 a majority of the
Supreme Court adhered closely to the second approach in
concluding that private, homosexual behavior was not
constitutionally protected. 155 Justice White, writing for the
majority, noted that the Court "comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution." 156 Sensitive to this caution, the Court
concluded that homosexual conduct was not entitled to
heightened constitutional protection because, far from being
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," homosexuality had long
been rejected by Western culture as deviant behavior. 157
Justice Blackmun, by contrast, took a much broader view
of the privacy right. He concluded that history and tradition
were irrelevant because the state prohibition of homosexual
conduct intruded upon what he called "'the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely,
'the right to be let alone."' 158 According to Justice Blackmun,
autonomy simpliciter-not history, tradition, or community
values-determines the content of the privacy right. 159
The divergent approaches to defining the content of the
privacy right raise difficult questions for the future. As a
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matter of separation of powers, the uncertainty has the
potential of shifting a vast reservoir of policymaking authority
from the legislative arena into the judicial branch. The
eagerness with which various groups, each promoting its
cherished "right," have seized upon privacy theory to further
their agendas is mute testimony to this fact. Hardwick itself is
evidence that constitutional privacy litigation is undertaken
more in the name of furthering a cause than protecting the
rights of individual litigants; no actual prosecution was
pending against Mr. Hardwick at the time he filed his suit. 160
As Bruce Hafen has noted, "the case was not concerned with
actually protecting Hardwick. Rather, the case was a forum for
urging the Court to lead the way in shaping a new cultural
consensus." 161
The dispute regarding the content of the privacy right has
troubling sociological overtones as well. The decision that a
particular area lies within a zone of "privacy" or "autonomy"
effectively shuts out all considerations beyond those deemed
relevant by the individual himself. Thus, in the course of
deciding in Roe v. Wade 164 that the right of privacy included
the right to terminate a pregnancy, the Court essentially
decreed that all considerations except the woman's own
reproductive desires were irrelevant (at least until the unborn
child could fend for itself). 163 As a result, society's
traditionally cherished interest in protecting unborn life, as
well as the long-recognized interests of all other individuals
impacted by a pregnancy (including the biological father) were
put beyond the pale. The decision, in short, decreed that the
community had no right to further communal interests in an
area intimately tied to the preservation of society
itself-human reproduction. 164
This is not the place to debate the merits of the Court's
abortion jurisprudence. What Roe v. Wade and subsequent
decisions evidence, however, is the potential of modern privacy
doctrine to cut the individual off from the demands of society in
ways that go well beyond the express provisions of the Bill of
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Rights. 165 The completely private individual-secure in a
tight little autonomy bubble that bristles with enforceable,
porcupine-like rights-comes to exist outside and independent
of the community. Such an autonomous individual, moreover, is
increasingly encouraged to shout, "I know my rights!" and to
forget or minimize the responsibilities that society has, in the
past, legitimately imposed.
The extent to which privacy doctrine will effectively
immunize the individual from social demands depends upon
the approach the Court takes in explicating that doctrine. If
the Court emphasizes the role of history and tradition, relied
upon by the concurring opinions in Griswold, privacy doctrine
will reinforce community values and thereby serve as a "link to
the past rather than a slide into the future." 166 Should the
Court follow the path blazed by Justice Blackmun, however,
quite the contrary will occur. I, for one, am personally troubled
by that possibility.
It seems clear enough that the Framers of the Bill of
Rights intended its provisions to free the individual from
odious invasions of personal liberty by the government, and to
secure the conditions under which a free society could best
thrive. 167 Justice Blackmun's theory of autonomy, however,
raises the possibility that the Bill of Rights can be pressed to
the point where individuals-but not the community-may
survive. Legal scholars and philosophers beyond my abilities
have raised cautions regarding this issue. 168 For present
purposes, and in conclusion, I simply wish to point out the
obvious: in defining the precise content of the modern right of
privacy, courts-and the entire legal profession-must keep an
eye, not only on the individual, but on the community. For, in
our eagerness to protect the golden egg, we may kill the goose
that laid it.
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